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A FIELD-BASED INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECT OF EXPERT SYSTEM
USE ON THE INFORMATION PROCESSING CAPACITY OF THE FIRM
John J. Sviokla
Graduate School of Business Administration
Harvard University
ABSTRACT
To date, there have been many reports on the use of decision support systems (DSS) and knowledge-
based systems (KBS) in organizations. Little of this research evaluates the impact of commercial
systems on the performance of the organization using the system. This study attempts to shed some
light on this intellectual domain.
This paper reports on a field-based investigation into the effects of the use of MUDMAN™ (a
commercial expert systems product) on the information-processing capacity of N.L. Baroid, an oil
services firm. The study uses the notions of organizational programs as defined by March and Simon
and operationalizes the information processing capacity framework £ut forth by Galbraith to show howinformation-processing capacity was affected when the MUDMAN system was used at Baroid.
1. INTRODUCTION Despite the large number of reported cases and research
articles, few investigators have chosen to focus on the
Luconi, Malone, and Scott-Morton (1985) note three effects the use of these tools have on the user organization.
defining features of an expert system (ES). First, an ES This article will focus on how the use of an expert system
uses special-purpose knowledge about a particular problem had an impact in one firm.
domain; second, it uses symbolic reasoning rather than only
numeric calculation; and third, it performs better than Scott-Morton (1984), perhaps as a result of his early work
nonexpert humans. In comparing ES, DSS, and Expert in an extensive review of over 300 articles on Management
Support Systems (ESS), the authors distinguish four Support Systems (MSS), noted a lack of research into
categories: data, procedures, goal/constraints, and changes caused by MSS, saying "much work has been done
strategies. In a DSS, the computer and the human share on the impacts of traditional management information
responsibilities for managing data, use of procedures, systems, but virtually nothing on the impacts of MSS"
setting goals and constraints, but the problem-solving (p. 31).
strategies are left to the human. In an expert support
system, the computer shares the realm of flexible problem- In a more recent evaluation of the research literature in
solving strategies as well. For our purposes we will use the DSS, group DSS (GDSS) and ES, Benbasat and Nault
definition of an ESS, as defined by Luconi, Malone, and (1988) found a similar hole in the intellectual fabric of the
Scott-Morton, but for convenience we will call it an ES. field. They categorized the literature into "design" and
"effects of use" camps. Within the effects of use they found
1.1 Impacts of Expert Systems that most of the work had evaluated the effects of DSS and
GDSS on the individual; however, "work on the effects of
Michael Scott-Morton (1967, 1971) provided one of the EiS use is rare" (p. i). Thus despite a propitious beginning
very first studies of the impact of decision support systems by one of the founders of the field -- a full twenty-one
(DSS). In a study of a laundry equipment manufacturer's years ago -- few have endeavored to measure effects of our
use of a marketing/manufacturing DSS, he found that the nontransaction MIS systems on the organization.
system had a profound impact on the speed of the deci-
sions and the detail of data considered. Moreover, he This research study approaches this problem by drawing on
discovered that the system helped the organization commu- existing theories of information processing capacity
nicate coherently and concisely about complex manufactur- (Galbraith 1973, 1977) and organizational programs
ing and marketing trade-offs. (March and Simon 1958) to create rough measures as a
guide to a field-based investigation.
Since that time we have had books and articles on DSS
(Alter 1980; Bennett 1983; Keen and Scott-Morton 1978) 1.2 Methodology
and, more recently, on ES (Harmon, Maus and Morrissey
1988; Feigenbaum, McCorduck and Nii 1988). (For a Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1986), in a review of case
more extensive literature review, sce Sviokla 1986.) research in information systems, noted that one important
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motivation for case research occurs when "the research is Such a set of responses we call ape,fonnance program,
interested in complex problems which cannot be removed or simply aprogram. For example, the sounding of the
from the setting without destroying the phenomenon" (p. alarm gong in a fire station initiates such a program. So
7). does the appearance of a relief applicant at a social
worker's desk. So does the appearance of an automobile
Bonoma (1985) advocates the use of case research in chassis in front of the work station of a worker on the
environments "where the existing body of knowledge is assembly line-(p. 141).
insufficient to permit the posing of causal questions, and
when a phenomenon cannot be studied outside the context Galbraith (1977) defines the information-processing
in which it naturally occurs" (p. 207). capacity of an organization to be the diversity of the
outputs, the number of different input resources, and the
Understanding how the use of an expert system has an level of task performance. For example, an organization
impact on a firm's information-processing capacity is with a high diversity of outputs, a high level of task
entwined with an understanding of the business process it performance, and a large number of inputs, has a high
is designed to support. Hence a case study seemed level of information-processing capacity. The operational-
appropriate. Yet, to avoid "mindless empiricism" (Haupt- ization of the three components that make up infurmation-
mann 1989), two guiding measures were employed: processing capacity for this study are pragmatic and simple.
organizational program maps and information-processing Input* are defined as the number of data sources used and
capacity. people consulted in the delivery of the product or service
(the product/service is defined in Table 1). Outputs are
13 Definition of Measures defined as the number of different versions of the product/
service. The level of task pe,fo,mance is the manage-
The organizational program is operationalized by creating ment's assessment of performance and any available
process-flow diagrams that map out the steps necessary to objective measures. The author rated these measures
execute the task being examined. All flow diagrams have within each site.
been generated by the author. (Sce Table 1 for a defini-
tion of task. (The sample unit for each site is the task A second design factor was chosen to sharpen the focus on
organization, also defined in Table 1.) measuring impacts. In order to capture the effects of the
ES use on the information-processing capacity and on
organizational programs, a pre-post design was employed,
Table 1 that is, the behavior of the organization around a narrow
task was compared before and after the use of the tool.
Some Definitions The site (Baroid) was selected from a list of over 30
potential sites for three reasons. First, it had an expert
• Die task (or, the business task): The business system in routine use. (Routine use was defined as used
task that the expert system is designed to support. at least once a day in a nontest decision context.) Second,
For example, the task for PlanPower (a financial the task had substantial tracking and tracing associated
planning expert system) is "financial planning." with it, so many documents addressing past decisions and
their effects were available for examination. Third, the
• 77:e task omanization: The task organization is system addressed a nontrivial business problem.
a group of individuals who are active in the
creation and delivery of the product/service. The drawback of the Baroid site was that there were no
active implementation efforts underway -- all sites that
• 71:ep,uduct The product and/or service which were going to use the system were already using it. Thus,
the task is designed to create (in MUD planning, the only "pre" implementation state available to the
the MUD plan is one facet of the product). researcher was historical reconstruction. Due to the paper
trail kept for the decision process, and the long experience
of the managers involved in the study, the historical
The operationalization of the first measure, organizational
account was rich. Yet, the reliability of self reports is often
programs, builds directly on March and Simon's (1958) suspect and two efforts review with participants and
triangulation), discussed below, were used to bolster thenotion of an organizational program:
veracity of the accounts to allow for pre-post comparison.
Pe®rmance programs (or programs). We have seen
that under certain circumstances the search and choice All data (25 interviews, five day-long site visits, and
processes are very much abridged. At the limit, an voluminous archival data) were gathered by the author.
environmental stimulus may evoke immediately from the Having a single rater for all measures has its benefits and
organization a highly complex and organized set of costs. On the one hand, the single observer is more likely
to rate things in a similar manner and to be more consis-responses.
tent. On the other hand, single-viewpoint assessment may
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bias the data. Two methods in the data collection design remained important buyer criteria, but customer focus on
are used to strengthen the reliability of the data: review cost of the product intensified as drilling muds became
of data with individuals in the user organization and more and more of a commodity.
triangulation. Yin (1984) and others (Bonoma 1985;
Roethlisberger 1977) have advocated reviewing case
materials with members of the organization under study as 3. THE ISSUE: MUD ENGINEERING
a means of checking impressions, perspectives, and facts.
This method was employed. Mud engineering is often challenging. Rigs can cost up to
$500,000 per day to operate; thus, when one stops drilling,
The second reliability-enhancing measure, triangulation the financial pressure to resume drilling is tremendous.
(Bonoma 1985; Jick 1979), is a technique using different Mud engineers say that mud is "the first thing to be
types of data to triangulate on any particular claim or blamed" for any trouble because all aspects of exploratory
insight. Three types of data were collected to understand drilling -- cutting, logging, easing -- occur in the presence
the nature of the task: of mud. Incorrect or inattentive mud management can
lead to serious well problems such as a "stuck pipe" or a
• interviews blowout. Unlike the romantic movie image, which often
• observation shows a happy rig crew applauding a geyser of oil, a
• archival data blowout in the oil field can spew out drilling equipment,
injure or kill well hands, and destroy millions of dollars
These multiple sources of data allow triangulation of the worth of equipment. Many possible problems - such as
rater's interpretation. The combination of these method- blowouts -- are usually foreshadowed by changes in the
ological efforts attempt to counterbalance the single- mud and an alert mud engineer can take preventive
observer bias. measures.
From the oil company's perspective, mud management is
2. THE COMPANY SETTING usually a relatively small percentage of its cost. An
offshore well platform might spend $5 to $20 million on
NL Baroid or (Baroid)1 was the largest division of NL mud in a year. Generally, the cost of mud is approximately
Industries, a conglomerate which provides products and six to eight percent of the drilling operator's costs.
services to the oil and chemical industries. Baroid's 1985
revenues of $382.7 million accounted for 27.9 percent of Even though mud costs are a small share of total costs,
NL Industries' total of $1.4 billion. Specializing in sales of operators are conscious of any controllable expense and
drilling fluids both to the major oil companies, such as are always anxious to keep mud bills as low as possible.
Exxon, Gulf, and Shell, and to smaller, independent More important, good mud management can lead to a
producers, Baroid was the largest such supplier in the more efficient well being drilled, which can mean substan-
world. tial savings in drilling costs. Furthermore, mud manage-
ment infiuences overall well quality, which in turn can
The 1980s were years of boom and bust of the oil industry. affect the value and volume of oil (or other substance)
In 1981, oil reached its highest price. Drilling became extracted at the surface.
more active, with over 4,000 rigs in operation in the United
States. From this high, the industry dropped to its post- In order to appreciate what MUDMAN was designed to
WWII low. Prices for crude oil in mid-1986 were near do, it is helpful to understand the nature of the mud
$10.00 per barrel, threatening to go to $8.00 or even to engin6er's job. When drilling a well, drilling fluids are
$6.00. Drilling activity fell to less than 700 active wells in pumped down the center of the drill pipe, exit from nozzles
the United States. on the drill bit, and circulate back up to the surface where
they are monitored, cleaned, and recirculated.
Financial figures for Baroid show this industry plunge. In
1981, its revenues were $709.7 million; in 1985, $382.7 Mud is usually a mixture of water, clay, weighting material,
million -- a drop of 41.6 percent. During these four years, rare earths, and other chemicals. Mud engineers monitor
the company lost approximately half its employees and and regulate the properties of the drilling fluids to influ-
trimmed all budgets severely. ence the characteristics of the well being drilled, that is, the
"bore hole" characteristics. Ideally, the drilling fluid is
Technology leadership had played an important role in maintained to optimize a number of factors simultaneously:
establishing Baroid as a industry leader. Some experts felt
that many of the technical breakthroughs in drilling muds • Hole clearing (the removal of cuttings)
had occurred during the 1920-1960 time frame. Since then, • The suspension of cuttings and other material
most major oil-service companies carried a full line of during interruptions in circulation
muds. The basis for competition shifted from technology • The removal of sand and cuttings from the mud
toward price. Service record, reputation, and expertise (done at the surface)
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• The prevention of caving and sloughing in the hole 4.1 Pre-MUDMAN: Developing a Mud Plan
• The control of subsurface pressures
Generally, the oil-service company works with the drilling
Any one mud ingredient may help preserve a number of operator to design the mud plan, which describes what type
factors on this list simultaneously. For example, clay helps of mud will be used at each different stage of the drilling.
keep the cutting in suspension so that if the circulation of Previous drilling experience in that location is the primary
the mud stops for any reason, the drilling shavings may not information upon which the two participants draw when
fall down to the bottom of the bore hole and clog it. Clay creating the plan. There is an art to creating effective mud
and other solids in the mud create a veneer of sheathing plans because each well can have very different mud
on the wall of the hole, known as the wall cake, which requirements. For instance, two wells drilled off the same
helps to keep the hole from sloughing -- that is, from drilling platform, in the same area, might have completely
caving in. Another multiple-function ingredient is barite different geological formations which require different
-- the most popular weighting material. Barite has a high muds. Experience and judgment are important guides to
specific gravity. Its weight helps to keep all fluids, gases, the mud planning.
and other material from seeping into the hole from the
surrounding geological formation. Barite is also relatively A mud plan designated all muds that were to be used,
inert, so that it does not react with other materials it when they were to be used, and how they were to be used.
contacts. Mud requirements changed depending on the depth of the
well. For instance, when a drilling operation was in its
The challenge for the mud engineer arises because the early stages, progress was often easy. An operator might
factors listed above are always changing. Depth of the quickly drill down hundreds of feet below the earth's crust.
well, changing strata being drilled through, and mechanical As the hole drilled deeper, many factors became progres-
difficulties can all shift the mud properties. To keep the sively more challenging. The weight of the drilling pipe,
mud within desired parameters can take frequent adjust- or drill string, increased as tons of steel tube pressed down
ment. into the bore hole. A good mud engineer combined exper-
ience in the field with a knowledge of mud engineering so
that the probability of a smooth drilling operation was
4. MUD ENGINEERING ORGANIZATIONAL maximizing while the cost of the mud was minimized. See
PROGRAMS: PRE- AND POST-MUDMAN Figure 1 for a diagram of the pre-MUDMAN Mud Plan
Organizational Program.
Mud management entails three basic steps:
4.2 Pre-MUDMAN: Mud Management On-Site
1. Developing a mud plan2
2. On-site mud management The next responsibility on the mud engineer's list was mud




Meet to pool Match well with Generate the mud
*= data/discuss - past experience -Ii/- plan:
experience and determine o mud use
mud needs o mud type
o mud cost for
Baroid Engineer each level of
gathers data well
Figure 1. Pre-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program Map
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was isolated on the rig conducting the mud tests, writing At least once per 24-hour day, the mud engineer gathers
out a report, and sending it -- via mail or facsimile -- to a bucket of mud to analyze in the mud-lab (which is always
the field office. (Facsimile use was relatively new and close at hand and usually on site). When problems are
limited.) Sometimes, after submitting the report, the ME occurring, the mud can be sampled hourly, or more often,
would call and check in with the office as well. if necessary.
In order to determine what is happening hundreds or The likelihood of running into problems with the mud
thousands of feet below the surface, the mud engineer varies greatly with the type of well being drilled. Once a
monitors about 20 mud parameters -- such as density, promising geological area is identified, one or more
solids content, and filtrate characteristics -- to see if they exploratory, or "wildcat," wells will be drilled in search of
are within the expected values. There are many possible deposits. The term "wildcat" comes from the fact that in
causes of deviation from desired levels: for example, the a new territory, a driller never knows exactly what will be
geology being drilled through can have mineral embedded encountered. For this same reason, mud management is
in it which reacts with the mud; the drilling equipment can especially challenging during exploration.
be circulating the mud poorly, ruining its chemistry; or the
mud equipment itself might not be performing filtration Problems on a rig could range from a minor fluctuation in
correctly. Issues can arise as isolated incidents or they can the value of a mud parameter to "stuck pipe" or a blowout.
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Figure 2. Pre-MUD Mud Management Organizational Program Map
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mud engineer usually took more mud samples and kept in 4.4 MUDMAN: What it Does
closer contact with the field and district office. If a
problem arose at the site, the first responsibility of the Baroid sells MUDMAN as a service to its customers for
district managers was to obtain the most recent data about $350 per day -- the same rate as it costs to hire a mud
the well and make their own analyses. Often, the mud engineer. As the MUDMAN brochure states:
engineer would send samples to the field office for
additional analysis. Escalation up Baroid's chain of Designed to work with your Baroid technologist in analyz-
command could occur almost immediately if the problem ing and correcting downhole problems, MUDMAN is more
was severe enough; if necessary, test samples might be air- than just a data-processing system. It's the first practical
shipped to the Houston labs. While the problem contin- application of artificial intelligence in the drilling industry.
ued, consultations between the shore personnel and the
ME on the rig occurred often as diagnoses were designed MUDMAN includes an expert system for drilling mud
and treatments tried. The managers were kept informed analysis, electronic mail facilities, a database to record
about the results of each attempt. If necessary, more mud data, an ability to perform complex calculations such
experienced engineers went to the site to assess the as hydraulics analysis, and a report-generation facility for
problem first-hand and to demonstrate to the customer the creation of mud-analysis reports. The MUDMAN
that Baroid was willing to send its best people out on a expert system performs three basic functions:
problem if needed. See Figure 2 for a pre-MUDMAN
Mud Management Organizational Program Map. • data input;
• analysis of the data -- diagnosis of deviations from
43 Pre-MUDMAN: Mud-Reporting mud plan or previous mud values; and
• treatment recommendations:
The last major ME responsibility, mud-reporting, which
occurred at the end of the drilling, was to create a report The mud engineer usually begins a session with MUD-
that included all the daily logs, relevant billing, and ac- MAN by entering the new values for mud parameters.
counting data about the well. The report compiled a These can then be compared against either the mud plan
complete and accurate record of the material used and or the previous mud values. The initial diagnosis is a
detailed not only the types, volumes and costs of the mud, simple list of those parameters that were off-target.
but analyzed the effectiveness of different mud treatments
for different well issues. This document was usually 20 to MUDMAN then diagnoses probable causes for these
200 pages long, depending on the length of the well's deviations from expected values. After analysis, the
operation. The tedious, exacting work on reports was the engineer can request treatment recommendations which
least favorite part of the ME's job, and it was not uncom- give the specific quantities and types of mud to be added
mon for a manager to remind a mud engineer to finish the with reasons for their addition. At every point in the
mud report in a timely and complete manner. See Figure process, an explanation capability is available to tell why a
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Figure 3. Pre-MUDMAN Mud-Reporting Organizational Program Map
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The software for MUDMAN was developed on a VAX Before MUDMAN, I kept my own records. A good
11/780™ and runs on Digital's Micro-VAX II™ hardware. mud engineer keeps good records. Where MUDMAN
In general, a user dialed the Houston office in order to use helps is that it makes the records more accessible. For
MUDMAN, but it had been successfully tried remotely on example, there was some planning being done recently
a Micro-VAX II in the field as well. The program was for a new well off a platform in an area where we had
written in a number of different computer languages, just finished a different well. The engineers creating
including LISP, BLISS, and OPS-5. that mud plan wanted to know what the weight of the
mud was for a particular depth (drilling depth). In
order to get that information they needed tolind the
4.5 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Engineering Program daily reports for the other well and dig through them.
It is more likely that, rather than searching out the old
MUDMAN was first introduced on a nontest well in carly data, they would have relied on their previous experi-
spring 1985. The use of MUDMAN influenced all three ence to estimate the mud weight. With MUDMAN,
aspects of the ME's job -- planning, management, and they were able to call up the data needed and know
report writing. the real numbers of the other well -- they liked that
access.
In examining the effects of MUDMAN use it is helpful to
recall that MUDMAN contains three basic elements: an In addition to the availability of the database, there was a
ES to aid in mud engineering, a database, and a communi- facility in MUDMAN that helped the mud engineer design
cations facility. The MUDMAN system is an integrated a mud plan from scratch. So far, MUDMAN's greatest
support and communications tool. Some of the effects of influence on the mud planning part of the job seemed to
MUDMAN seemed caused by the ES component directly come from the fact that data from the drilling of recent
-- such as improved diagnostic capability. Yet, most of the wells was readily accessible. The database of well informa-
effects seemed to be enabled by the ES, but were caused tion was generated through ongoing use of the MUDMAN
by the availability of the well data and diagnostic status diagnostic tool on different wells around the globe. Hence,
which were readily communicated across the Baroid the ES enabled the creation of the database, which in turn
organization; that is, they were caused by the database and influenced the process of mud planning. See Figure 4 for
communications capabilities. This latter set of effects were the post-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program
facilitated by ES use, but not caused by it. Map.
4.6 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Planning 4.7 Post-MUDMAN: Mud Management On-Site
In mud planning, MUDMAN gave better access to In post-MUDMAN mud management, for the second ME
previous well data. One of the mud engineers in Louisiana responsibility, the engineer still went through the same
using MUDMAN recounted an example: process of sampling the mud. However, instead of
 "Company Man'
gathers data
Meet to pool Match well with Generate the mud
i data/discuss -1. past experience --* plan:
experience and determine • mud use
mud needs • mud type
• mud cost for
each level ofBaroid Engineer




Figure 4. Post-MUDMAN Mud Plan Organizational Program Map
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reporting the data by hand on an American Petroleum treatment and predict probable effects on the well. This
Institute form and sending it via mail or facsimile to the gave the mud engineer the option of experimenting with
field office, the data were entered into MUDMAN. mud treatments before actually performing the activity.
According to one mud engineer, this simulation capability
When the information was put into the system, the analysis gave him more confidence in the mud analysis and treat-
and the data were available immediately to the shore ment he recommended. See Figure 5 for the post-MUD-
management at the field office, the regional office, and MAN organizational program.
headquarters (because the MUDMAN diagnostic program
resided at Houston). All data were entered on remote
terminals located on the wells. The MUDMAN data were 4.8 Post-MUDMAN: Report Writing
accessible to all Baroid field sites using the proper pass-
word and security information. As a vice president for With MUDMAN, another benefit of the database part of
Drilling and Completion Services noted: the system was that interim reports were possible, daily
recaps were also more readable and complete, and the
If I want to, I can call up the daily mud report summary reports could be drawn up only a few hours after
first thing in the morning. Before, I would have a well reached the target depth. This last capability -- the
to wait on the mud engineer to fill out his report ability to create a mud report rapidly -- was an important
and fax [send it by facsimile] to me -- or I could sales tool.
try to get the engineer on the phone. Generally
I might keep tabs on sensitive or important wells At the end of a well, the Baroid engineers wanted to be
so that if someone from the client company calls able to go to the customer and describe how the mud
me and asks about the status of a given well, I can service went. When the job was done correctly, Baroid
be right up to date and informed. liked to show the "company man" the figures as soon as
possible to let the customer know what a good job had
The daily facsimile usually went only to the field office been done. If the information was available immediately,
responsible for the well except when it was requested by it might influence the buyer to purchase Baroid products
another manager. Managers reported that the communica- and services for another well, especially if more drilling
tion of the analysis and well-status by MUDMAN meant was scheduled in the same area. If it took weeks or
that more people were informed on the day-to-day well months to generate the report, much of the data's value
situation sooner. This seemed to change the nature of might be lost. See Figure 6 for the Post-MUDMAN Mud-
problem reporting. For instance, when a problem arose, Reporting Organizational Program Map.
the engineering managers already were familiar with the
specifics of the geology, mud, and recent drilling history of As the director of the MUDMAN project explained:
the well. Again, the ES part of MUDMAN provided the
template to enter the status information and provided a The mud salesman would often be persona non
diagnosis of the well situation. Yet it was the con:muni- gram at an oil company's office. They would not
cation of this standardized data and diagnosis that affected want to be bothered by oil service salesmen telling
the diagnostic procedure ofBaroid because communication the same old tale. With the MUDMAN report,
of the data kept more people better infurmed. it gives our satesmen active and current informa-
tion to bring to the oil company engineers. It
Because mud engineering was an "on-line" activity, time helps us keep our contacts active and relationships
was often precious. The fact that other experts, back in current with daily reports and then with a prompt
the regional, district, and home offices, were more up to final report.
date and informed of the well status was considered a
critical aid in quick and correct analysis and control of well All three organizational programs -- mud planning, mud
problems. In effect, the importance of the change in management, and mud reporting -- were significantly
reporting method was amplified by the pressure of the affected by the use of MUDMAN at Baroid. Where the
task. Furthermore, the mud engineers throughout the organizational programs highlighted the process changes
company could review MUDMAN's opinion of the situa- at the site, the organizational information processing
tion so that they had a common diagnostic reference base measures try to assess the effect of MUDMAN use.
in addition to common data upon which to build any
further analysis or monitoring of the well.
5. POST-MUDMAN: INFORMATION PROCESSING
Another useful feature of the MUDMAN expert system CAPACITY
was simulation. It was possible to simulate a mud treat-
ment so that when a mud engineer decided on the specific We now move to the second measure of the impact of
solution to the problem, he or she was able to enter the MUDMAN -- information-processing capacity. As men-
recommended treatment. With this information added to tioned earlier, Galbraith (1977) defines the information-
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of the outputs, the number of different resources, and the
level of task performance. As noted above, the determina-
tion of the information-processing capacity of the task Houston Office
organization at Baroid consisted of evaluating of the three
components that make up information-processing capacity: A
inputs, outputs, and level of task performance.
In the MUDMAN case, there was evidence of increased Regional Office
information-processing capacity. The list of inputs, out-
puts, and task performance is shown in Table 2. A
5.1 Inputs District Office
Early use of the MUDMAN system revealed that there
were a number of new inputs to the task of mud engineer-
ing. Figure 7 shows the chain of command from the well
site back to the Houston headquarters. There were three Mud Engineeron Well
mud engineering managers responsible for the ME's
performance on the platform: the district manager, the
regional manager, and the Houston office. These three
offices had on-line access to the mud engineering situation.
Mud engineering managers reported that they could keep Figure 7. Baroid Chain of Command from Well Site to




o Mud engineer + + Mud engineer and mud-engineering management
o Previous well data + + Previous well data and trend data '
+ + MUDMAN
Outputs-Increased
o Mud plan = Mud plan
o API daily mud form + More exact/accessible daily mud report
+ On-well support
+ + Interim summaries and trend sheets
Task Performance-Significantly Increase
o At least one mud report perr 12-hour period = At least one mud report per 12-hour period
o Daily reporting + Daily reporting -- prompt/analysis now passed on
+ + Better diagnosis -- four previously unsolved
problems were solved using MUDMAN
o Finish mud report (1-20 weeks) + + Finish mud report faster (1 hour to 2-3 days)
The designations before each item on the list are indicators of the direction and the strength of the change in that
category. For example = is the same, + + is strongly increased, - is decreased, etc.
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The increased involvement of the managers in review of With MUDMAN the mud engineer found it easy to keep
the mud data meant that Baroid could be that much more consistent daily records of all well and inventory informa-
effective in dealing with severe or immediate problems on tion. As a result, when a drilling operation ended, compil-
the well because the extra experts were already informed ing the mud report only took a few hours. The database
about the well status and recent operations. This added created through use of the ES was complete and consis-
involvement seemed to occur in the early MUDMAN tent. Consequently, it was not uncommon for a mud
wells. At the time of this study, it was not certain whether engineering manager to have the final mud report almost
this improvement was temporary and caused by the novelty immediately and in a form ready to present to the cus-
of the system, or if the effect would linger. It seems tomer.
reasonable to assume that on difficult wells, the managers
would avail themselves on the most up-to-date information Another major benefit was improved diagnosis of the well
available as part of their ongoing effort to keep informed problems. The director of the MUDMAN project re-
about potential problems. Therefore, the effect could ported that, in four separate instances, MUDMAN had
continue for the more challenging wells. been integral in solving a previously unsolved diagnostic
problem. The most dramatic example was on a well in the
Concerning data, the mud engineers had on-line use of the North Sea. Baroid's client was drilling a well experiencing
trend analysis. In the diagnostic process of the expert a "carbonate problem" -- that is, carbonates were contami-
system, MUDMAN indicated when the current mud nating the mud. The drilling operator had been treating
parameters violated expected values. Expected values were the carbonate problem on and off for ten years. A few
based on the mud plans, which usually have a high and low days after the MUDMAN service was purchased for the
value to bracket the desired value. In addition, there was well and the system was given a few days' worth of mud
an analysis of trend data and, even if a mud parameter parameters, MUDMAN suggested that there might be a
were within its bracketed values, MUDMAN might issue leakage of CO2 gas from the surrounding formation into
a warning that a sharper-than-expected increase of one or the bore hole. At first, the drilling operator did not believe
more values of the mud parameters could indicate a that this was the problem, but after investigation, C02 was
potential problem. In this way, MUDMAN consistently found to be the cause of the carbonate contamination.
analyzed historical data during mud diagnosis. Further, the Once the correct diagnosis was reached, the remedy was
mud engineer used more of the previous well data in the clear -- raise the specific gravity of the mud to increase the
analyses because the data were readily available during thc mud weight sufficiently to drive the CO2 back into the
diagnosis phase of the session. Altogether, inputs to the formation surrounding the bore hole. This was done and
mud engineering process increased -- some because of the the carbonate problem was solved. This evidence suggests
ES, some as a result of the database. that use of the MUDMAN expert system can improve the
consistency and exactness of the mud diagnostic process.
5.2 Outputs Use seemed to improve the execution of the organizational
program, although a study of expert performance with and
The outputs in the form of daily reports and interim mud without the aid of MUDMAN would be necessary to show
reports were more consistent and could be accessed faster. definitively that MUDMAN improved performance.
Pre-MUDMAN, a well would rarely have an interim report
that detailed the muds used, their cost, and the symptoms In addition to the observed increases in task performance,
encountered at the drilling site. Post-MUDMAN, it was senior Baroid managers conjectured that MUDMAN use
common to create an interim report, both for use on the might increase the information-processing capacity of the
rig by the mud engineer talking with the operator on-site, entire mud engineering cadre by allowing more mud
and for use by Baroid sales people and service people engineers to operate more effectively in the field. Howev-
when going to the oil company buying the service. The er, in 1986, the drilling industry was in such a deep
result was a new, on-going documentation and reporting of depression that the potential for MUDMAN to help
the well to both Baroid and the customer -- leading to an Baroid deal with peak needs, in terms of mud diagnostic
assessment that outputs from the process increased. capabilities, could not be tested until the market for oil
rebounded. Even without a great increase in demand for
mud services, the task performance for mud diagnosis
53 Task Performance seemed to have significantly increased from the pre-
MUDMAN state to the post-MUDMAN state.
Pre-MUDMAN, it usually took anywhere from six weeks
to six months to compile and write the mud report for the
client. Much of the time was spent retrieving numbers, 6. SUMMARY
completing records, inventory, and resolving any discre-
pancies. For example, the inventory accounting records This field study suggests that, in this company, site use of
might not match the mud engineer's records of material, the MUDMAN system increased the information-process-
causing the ME to search painstakingly through every ing capacity of the task organization performing the tasks
report to see what was wrong and why. of mud planning, mud management, and mud reporting.
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Much more work is needed to investigate the information- Keen, P. G. W., and Scott-Morton, M. Decision Suppon
processing effects of system use in terms of the new Systems: An Organizational Perspective. Reading,
information-processing tasks that use creates and the Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978.
information-processing tasks it obviates. This single study,
in one site, was only able to begin to explore these com- Luconi, F.; Malone, T.; and Scott-Morton, M. S. "Expert
plexities. Support Systems." CISR Working Paper, Number 122,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985.
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